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ISSUES RAISED BY RESEARCH USING PERSONS SUFFERING
FROM DEMENTIA WHO HAVE IMPAIRED
DECISIONAL CAPACITY
PETER

V.

RABINS,

MD, MPH*

INTRODUCTION

Two basic assumptions underlie this discussion: First, appropriately designed clinical research is an ethical activity. Research necessarily treats the individual as an object to be observed, measured, or
intervened with, and it downplays or ignores the subjective aspects of
the human experience. The only justification for conducting research in this manner is that research can ultimately benefit the individual participant or other human beings by increasing knowledge
about the etiology, course, and treatment of human afflictions. For
research to be justified, there must be no other way to gather the information, the design of the study must minimize the risks to the individual, the design of the study must be appropriate to answer the
research question, and the research question should be one that is felt
by the research and non-research communities to have a utility in being answered.
The second assumption of this discussion is that the Nuremberg
Code,' its subsequent modifications and later implementing regulations form the basis of informed consent to participate in research. 2
The Code is frequently cited as the first statement of the concept of
informed consent, and its principles generally underlie all subsequent
documents and discussions of the topic.3 The Code requires that research participants be informed, comprehending, voluntary, and competent.' Clearly, the decisionally incapacitated cannot meet these
requirements. Therefore, only two options are available: First, do not
allow any research in persons unable to meet these criteria, or second,
* Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Geriatrics and Neuropsychiatry at the Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine. Dr. Rabins has focused his career on the study of
psychiatric disorders in older persons.
1. The Nuremberg Code (1948) reprinted in The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg
Code 2 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
2. See Greg A. Sachs et al., Ethical Aspects ofDementia Research: Informed Consent and Proxy
Consent, 42 CLIN. Res. 403 (1994).
3. See R. FADEN, A HIsrORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENTr 153, 154 (1986).
4. Id. at 155.
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construct special criteria that offer added protections and restrictions
to protect those who do not meet these criteria.5
Specific criteria which have been added to the basic principles of
the code are the assessment of potential benefits (e.g., therapeutic vs.
non-therapeutic; if therapeutic, low vs. high potential) and potential
risks (graded as less than minimal, minimal or more than minimal). 6
If added protections are needed to protect decisionally impaired individuals, then these risk and benefit criteria are likely to be a focus of
the modifications.
Decisional Incapacity
Decisional capacity is defined here as an aggregate of the cognitive processes which underlie communication, judgment, and reasoning. Impaired decisional capacity can have many causes. For
example, children are decisionally impaired by definition since
younger children have not developed the capacities or maturity
needed to make independent choices. The status of adolescents is
under active debate since many do have some or all of the attributes
identified by the Nuremberg Code,7 but at present, a single age, the
age of majority, is used as the point at which decisional capacity is
considered legally present. Nevertheless, children are not a focus of
this article because the ethical issues are different than for adults and
regulations for children exist that add protections. 8
In adults, a variety of disorders can impair decisional capacity.
Table 1 below organizes them into congenital and non-congenital disorders. These categories can be further broken down into focal brain
injury (in which the impairments are limited to a single or small
number of capacities) and generalized brain disorder, either delirium
(a cognitive decline, usually of acute onset, accompanied by an altered level of consciousness) or dementia (a generalized cognitive decline occurring with the normal level of consciousness).

5. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 403.
6. Id.
7. See Nuremberg Code, supra note 1.
8. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401- .409 (1997).
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Another group of conditions in which decisional capacity is occasionally impaired consists of the major mental illnesses (schizophrenia
and mood disorder). These. disorders usually do not impair decisional capacity, but some severely ill individuals do develop incapacities to comprehend, communicate, and make judgments. These
incapacities often resolve as the acute condition improves, but some
severely and persistently ill individuals are permanently incapacitated.
Dementia as a Cause of ImpairedDecisional Capacity
This paper will focus on dementia as a potential cause of impaired decisional capacity and will note relevant issues raised by other
disorders that can impair decisional capacity. Dementia is a medical
syndrome defined by three characteristics: a decline in cognitive ability, impairments in at least two distinct areas of cognition, and a normal level of alertness.9 Most dementias are irreversible, and many are
progressive.' 0 However, a diagnosis of dementia does not necessarily
indicate that decisional capacity is impaired because the cognitive impairments may not be of sufficient severity to abolish the capacity to
make reasoned decisions or may not impair those abilities needed to
make decisions. Nevertheless, many individuals with dementia, probably a significant majority, do have impaired capacity to consent to research. 1 An initial question, then, is whether research is justified in
persons with dementia, and if so, is the inclusion of incapacitated individuals ever justifiable?
Justicationsfor Research into Dementia
There are several justifications for research into dementia. First,
dementia is a prevalent problem, affecting 6-8% of individuals over
the age of 65.1 Second, the dementias cause serious morbidities in
all those they afflict.' 3 These include multiple cognitive impairments
and decrements in the ability to carry out everyday activities such as
dressing, bathing, walking, and feeding. 4 Hallucinations and delusions occur in 25-50% of individuals with dementia, aggressive and
agitated behavior occur in 25-40% of individuals, and depression and
9. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRc ASS'N, DtAGNOSTiC AND
(4th ed. rev. 1996).
10. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 410.
11. See id. at 405-07.
12. See N. MACE ETr AL., THE 36-HouR DAY- A FAMILY

STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS

GUIDE To CARING FOR PERSONS

WITH ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE, RELATING DEMENTING ILLNESS AND MEMORY Loss IN LATER LIFE

7 (1981).
13. See id. at 7-10.
14. See id.
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apathy occur in approximately 20% of individuals.'" Family and
friends who care for individuals with dementia also experience morbidity. 6 They experience emotional distress"' at rates two to three
times higher than the rates seen in otherwise similar non-caregivers.
Moreover, it is common for the caregiver to suffer social and financial
difficulties."8 Clearly, dementia is an appropriate syndrome to
research.
The next question is whether decisionally incapacitated subjects
need to be studied. If the important research questions could be answered by studying individuals with intact capacity to consent, then
decisionally incapacitated subjects should not be included. However,
most of the important research questions about dementia require the
participation of individuals who have dementia. They cannot be answered by studying cognitively intact individuals or by studying animal
models. Of more relevance to this discussion, many research questions can be answered only by including individuals who have more
severe forms of dementia - most of whom are decisionally incapacitated. One reason for this is that dementia is often difficult to diagnose until the symptoms become prominent,"9 by which time many
individuals have lost decisional capacity. Another reason is that the
large number of subjects needed for some studies (such as treatment
studies) requires the inclusion of decisionally incapacitated individuals. In addition, the care of the more severely incapacitated could not
be studied without their participation. Thus, research with decisionally incapacitated individuals with dementia is necessary and
appropriate.
Extra Protections
Since decisional incapacity is common in persons with dementia
and research is justifiable, added protections are appropriate. One
approach would be to ban the decisionally incapacitated from all nontherapeutic studies, that is, studies without potential direct benefit to
that person. Arguably, this may be too restrictive because it limits
some individuals from an act they might have chosen to do if they had
the capacity. It would also prevent them from aiding others who have
15. See id. at 117-124.
16. See Peter V. Rabins et al., 7he Emotional Impact of Caringfor the Chronically I1, 31
PSYCIIOSOMATIcS

331 (1990).

17. See Peter V. Rabins et al., The Impact ofDementia on the Family, 248JAMA 333 (1982).

18. See MACE, supra note 12, at 189.
19. See Stephen. J. Anderer, A Model for DeterminingCompentency in GuardianshipProceedings, 14 MENTAL & PH s. DISABILrTY LAw REP. 107, 109 (1990).
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a similar disorder (a group with whom an individual might have a
special affinity).
A less restrictive alternative would be to ban decisionally incapacitated subjects from "higher" risk research. This second approach offers some added protection but would still restrict individuals from
participating in a study they might have chosen to participate in were
they competent. If the argument that the individual may have wanted
to participate in research is accepted, then there should be clear evidence that the person would have chosen to participate in any study,
even one with a significant level of risk. Third, a reasonable accommodation would be to allow participation in non-therapeutic studies
which carry more than minimal risk only if the person has expressed a
prior wish to do so. This requirement adds meaningful protection but
does not prevent an act that some individuals would have chosen to
do, as long as there is convincing evidence that the person would have
made the choice when capacitated.
Finally, most individuals who have impaired decisional capacity
can give "assent" that is, they can indicate a willingness to go along
with the research. The issue of assent needs to be studied carefully
since it relies on observations that may well be unreliable and makes
inferences from scant information. However, individuals who, by observable behavior or by verbal statements, indicate that they are in
distress or discomfort should be considered to have expressed the desire to discontinue participation.
Research on the Consent Process in Persons with Dementia
While there is an extensive amount of literature on the assessment and determination of capacity to consent, most research based
articles relate to the consent to treatment, not to participation in research.2 0 To illustrate, Dr. L. Jamie Fitten and co-workers examined
51 residents of a Veterans Administration nursing home (many of
whom suffered from dementia) and administered three vignettes that
assessed the subjects' willingness to participate. 2 1 Using a clinician's
assessment as the standard for determining decisional capacity, they
determined that approximately one-third of subjects had intact decision-making capabilities. 22 Similarly, Dr. Cohen-Mansfield found that
a majority of subjects with some degree of cognitive impairment understood the nature of questions about life-sustaining therapies and
20. See, e.g., L. Jamie Fitten et al., Assessing Treatment Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly
Nursing Home Residents, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'v 1097 (1990).

21. See id.
22. See id.
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gave internally consistent answers.2 - Dr. Thomas E. Finucane, Associate Professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine, found that a small sample of outpatients with Alzheimer's
disease could discuss hypothetical situations about severe illness and
24
life-sustaining treatments without becoming emotionally distressed.
Dr. Meghan B. Gerety, of the Division of Geriatrics and Gerontology,
and Division of General Medicine at The University of Texas Health
Science Center, and her colleagues concluded that many subjects with
mild to moderate dementia had wishes similar to those of non-cognitively impaired individuals regarding treatment selections. 25 The cognitively impaired subjects were able to communicate their desires
clearly and base their treatment decisions on prognostic information
presented to them.2 6 In addition, the cognitively impaired subjects
were as consistent as the subjects with normal cognitive scores. 2 ' Dr.
Greg Sachs reported that many of the patients with dementia whom
they interviewed were able to communicate their values and preferences for enrolling in research. 2 ' Each of these studies demonstrates
that some patients with dementia have the capacity to engage in
meaningful discussions about their future care and have intact capacity to consent to treatment. It seems reasonable to extrapolate that
some individuals with Alzheimer's disease also have the capacity to
express preferences regarding participation in research.
Proxy Consent
The most widely used method for obtaining consent to participate in research from individuals with impaired capacity is to utilize a
proxy, usually defined as a person most authorized to act for another.29 Dr. Dallas M. High of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Kentucky surveyed researchers at thirteen Alzheimer's
disease research centers and found that consent was provided by farn23. Jiska Cohen-Mansfield et al., The Decision to Execute a Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care and Preferences Regarding the Utilization of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Nursing
Home Residents, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 289, 293-94 (1994).
24. Thomas E. Finucane et al., EstablishingAdvance Medical Directives with Demented Patients: A Pilot Study, 4J. CLIN. ETHICs 51, 52 (1993).
25. Meghan B. Gerety et al., Medical Treatment Preferences of Nursing Home Residents: Relationship to Function and Concordance with SurrogateDecision-Makers. 41 J. AM. GEmiATRICS SOC'v
953, 958 (1993).
26. Id
27. Id
28. Greg A. Sachs, Advance Consent for Dementia Research, 8 ALZHIEMER'S DISEASE & ASSOCIArED DISORDERS 19, 23-4 (Supp. 4, 1994).
29. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1981).
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ily members for 75% of the subjects."0 Forty-seven percent of the
projects were categorized by the researchers as potentially providing
direct benefit, but only 22% were thought to provide a potential
"medical" benefit."1 Dr. High also found that most proxy consents
were "informal," that is, were provided by a person with no legal standing as a substitute.3 2 Studies of proxy consent which focus on consent
to treatment generally do find that concordance between patients and
proxies on hypothetical scenarios is often low or no better than
chance.3 3 For example, Dr. Gerety found that agreement is best when
the scenarios refer to the subject's current state of health or to a vegetative state whereas agreement is poorest in intermediate states.3 4
Dr. John W. Warren, of the University of Maryland School of
Medicine, surveyed proxies about their decisions to allow nursing
home residents to participate in a minimal risk study.3 5 Of the surrogates who believed the patient would have refused to be a subject, 31%
consented to have the patient participate; that is, these surrogates frequently provided consent even though they believed that the consent
did not represent the patient's wishes. s6 More recently, Dr. Sachs examined the level of agreement between dementia patients and their
surrogates regarding the patient's preferences for research participation in four hypothetical studies.3" Agreement between patients and
their surrogates were modest at best.3" Dr. Sachs found that, overall,
surrogates give consent for their relatives to participate in research
more frequently than that person would have chosen.a 9 One explanation might be that surrogates are using a "best interest" standard
rather than the "substituted consent" standard that is assumed by
some to underlie proxy consent.
It could be argued that a mandate authorizing only legally designated proxies to give consent to research participation offers a higher
30. Dallas M. High, Advancing Research With Aisheimer's Disease Subjects: Investigators Perceptions and Ethical Issues, 7 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 165, 168 (1993).
31. Id. at 171-72.
32. ld. at 169.
33. See, e.g., Joseph G. Ouslander et al., Health Care Decisions Among Elderly Long-Term
Care Residents and Their PotentialProxies, 149 ARcHiVES INTERNmAL MED. 1367 (1989); Allison
B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions? 115 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 92 (1991); Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-Selected
Surrogates on Difficult Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHVES INTERNAL MED. 1049 (1992).
34. See Gerety, supra note 25, at 956-57.
35. John W. Warren et al., Informed Consent by Proxy, 315 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1124 (1986).
36. See id.
37. See Sachs, supra note 2 at 404, 408.
38. See id. at 407-08.
39. Id. at 409.
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degree of protection that is appropriate for research participation.
However, this would require that the proxy be either a court-appointed guardian or have been given durable power of attorney for
health care by the individual prior to losing capacity. This legal limitation would significantly hinder the research enterprise. For example,
many individuals do not designate an agent via a durable power of
attorney prior to losing capacity and, if they do, it does not typically
apply to research participation. Further, the legal process of becoming a guardian is costly and time consuming.
Another proposed solution is the development of a new instrument-the durable power of attorney for research participation. This
would designate an agent who would have power of attorney to consent to research participation if the individual became decisionally incapacitated. Such an instrument would strengthen the justification
that the agent is acting for the subject. Moreover, since the majority
of medical patients have not previously discussed their preferences for
life-sustaining treatment with family members or their physicians," it
seems likely that even fewer individuals will have discussed preferences for participation in research before a dementia becomes symptomatic. While the recommendation has been made that physicians
and investigators discuss possible future participation in research as
well as potential proxies with patients while they have decision making
capacity,4" the author knows of no data that demonstrate the effectiveness of such discussions. Therefore, even if it is desirable, the durable
power of attorney fot research is unlikely to be widely implemented.
Issues Unique to Dementia
The acquired dementing illnesses generally affect adults who
have had intact decisional capacity for many years. These individuals
have had the capacity and the time to develop wishes regarding willingness to participate in research. In contrast, adults with life-long
mental retardation who presently lack decisional capacity are likely
never to have had the capacity to consent to research.
Another difference between dementia and other disorders that
cause decisional incapacity is that dementia is so prevalent in later life
that many individuals will have a loved one or acquaintance who develops dementia. Such experiences could lead these individuals to
consider the possibility of becoming afflicted with dementia them40. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Proxy Decision Makingfor Incompetent Patients:An Ethical
and Empirical Analysis, 267 JAMA 2067, 2068 (1992).
41. See Warren, supra note 35; see also Sachs, supra note 2.

1998]

RESEARCH: PERSON SUFFERING FROM DEMENTIA

selves. Such a "personalizing" experience is much less likely in other
acquired states of decisional incapacity such as those due to head
trauma or delirium.4 2 (see Table I)
Furthermore, most dementias develop slowly and cause a gradual
development of decisional incapacity. Since this occurs over a significant period of time, most individuals with early symptoms of dementia
have intact capacity to consent to treatment and research. They may
also have the capacity to consider whether they want to participate in
research in the future if they become incapacitated.
Dementia differs from schizophrenia and mood disorders. These
major mental illnesses infrequently cause decisional incapacity, onset
often begins in adolescence or early adulthood and usually develop in
an individual who has had no prior contact with another individual
who has a mental illness.
DeterminingDecisionalIncapacity
One of the challenges facing clinicians and researchers is determining the point at which decisional capacity is lost. The difficulty
rests on a lack of agreement on the capabilities required for a person
to have intact decisional capacity. The strategies proposed to assess
capacity to consent range from in-depth neuropsychological batteries43 to an enumeration of underlying principles without operationalization.4 4 Recently, the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study
developed several instruments that measure the capacities which underlie competency, and its participants are in the process of develop-

ing shorter instruments.4 5 Whether instruments developed to assess a
patient's competency to agree to treatment will be relevant to the capacity to consent to research remains to be demonstrated.
42. Delirium is an acute, usually reversible organic mental syndrome characterized by
reduced ability to maintain attention to external stimuli and disorganized thinking as manifested by rambling, irrelevant, or incoherent speech. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA AND
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING AND ALLIED HEALTH (5th ed., 1972). Compared with
dementia, which is an organic mental syndrome characterized by a general loss of intellec-

tual abilities involving impairment of memory, judgment, and abstract thinking as well as
changes in personality. See id.
43. See, e.g., Morris Freedman et al., Assessment of Competency: The Role of Neurobehavioral
Deficits, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 203 (1991).

44. See generally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM.

J. PSYCHtATRY 279-84 (1977); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Assessing Patients'Capacitiesto Consent
to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988); Anderer, supra note 19.
45. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competency
Study Ill: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric Medical Treatments, 19 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 149 (1990).
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One difficulty with the search for neuropsychological indicators
of decisional incapacity is that these tests are dimensional, that is, they
make measurements on a continuous scale, while the concept of incapacity is categorical. Another problem is that several different cognitive processes underlie decisional capacity. Therefore, it is unclear
whether all must be impaired, whether some are more crucial than
others, and at what level each individual capacity must be impaired
before the general capacity of decision making is absent. On the
other hand, strengths of this method are the reliability of the measures and their ability to define a range within which the person moves
from having decisional capacity to lacking decisional capacity.
Problems also arise when defining incapacity by relying -on categorical criteria. For example, one criterion common to many definitions of incapacity is the presence of an "irrational" decision. Not only
is this unreliable and difficult to operationalize, it conflicts with the
principle of autonomy that supports the choice of foolish or unusual
choices.
A recent study sought to combine the strengths of the categorical
criteria approach and the neuropsychological approach.4" They
presented two vignettes to subjects with probable Alzheimer's disease
and to "normal" elderly controls and rated competency to consent to
medical treatment on five legal standards: evidencing choice, reasonable choice, appropriate consequences, rational reasons, and understanding choice.4 7 The older controls scored as "competent" on 72
out of 75 choices and scored as "incompetent" for I out of 75.48 Subjects with moderate Alzheimer's disease scored as competent on 28
out of 75 choices and "not competent" on 36 out of 75 choices.49 The
standard of "rational reasons" best distinguished between competent
subjects and non-competent subjects, and this standard correlated
with neuropsychological tests that measure "frontal lobe function"
such as the Initiation/Preservation Scale of the Dementia Rating
Scale. However, there are both technical (low reliability) and ethical
objections to the rational reasons criterion (noted above). Therefore,
no single standard is adequate to identify capacity to consent to medical treatment. This suggests that the determination of decisional ca46. Daniel C. Marson et al., Neuropsychologic Predictorsof Competency in Alzheimer's Disease
Using a Rational Reasons Standard, 52 ARGHcrEs NEUROLOGY 955 (1995).
47. See id. at 956; see also Marson et al., Assessing the Competency of Patients with Alzheimer's
Disease Under Different Legal Standards: A Prototype Instrument, 52 ARCH. NEUROL. 955, 956
(1995) (providing an empirical assessment of the competency of patients with Alzheimer's
disease to consent to medical treatment under five different legal standards).
48. See id. at 957.
49. See id.
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pacity should depend on a combination of objective data and an
appreciation of the context in which the decision is being made.
Decisional incapacity is a fluid concept, the definition of which
will change to reflect the values of society over time.5" Its definition
should rely on a combined judgment that includes the views of lay
people, clinicians, researchers, and ethicists, and its determination
should depend on neuropsychological and personal history data. Because it will remain difficult to identify the point at which decisional
incapacity develops, as one gradually moves from a capacitated to an
incapacitated state, researchers studying dementia must be cognizant
of and vigilant for the development of decisional incapacity. Moreover, because the desire for treatment is almost universally shared,
while the desire for research participation is not, society and researchers should err on the side of over-estimating decisional incapacity to
consent to research and have less stringent criteria for supporting capacity to consent to treatment.
The Issue of Multiple (or Conflict of) Interests
One issue that has received more attention in recent years is the
multiple conflicts of interest between those designing, implementing,
and participating in research. A recent editorial concerning these
conflicts of interest concluded that the issue is more appropriately
called "dual" interests. 1 I would broaden this further and suggest
that most individuals have "multiple interests." A researcher, for example, might be simultaneously interested in furthering knowledge,
furthering career, obtaining future funding to continue research, enhancing his or her reputation in order to get promoted, making a
patentable discovery that will provide financial rewards, and feeling
good about contributing to humankind. Persons who believe that researchers are abusing subjects also have multiple interests. They may
be motivated by a desire for public recognition, payment for writing
articles, revenge against perceived perpetrators of inhumane practices, status as an advocate for the downtrodden, and feeling good
about contributing to humankind.
The best we can do is to recognize that multiple interests are
often at work and to make public those interests which involve personal financial gain. Experience teaches that most participants are
50. See FADEN, supra note 3, at 200-01. (A discussion of the evolution of federal policy
governing human research).
51. Richard Horton, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Opprobrium or Obsession, 349
THE LANcE-r 1112 (1997).
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primarily motivated by positive, desirable motives, and this should be
presumed unless evidence is developed to demonstrate otherwise.
CONCLUSION

Research involving decisionally incapacitated individuals is ethically justifiable, but persons at risk and with decisional incapacity need
added protections. Therefore, there should be stricter standards for
the inclusion of decisionally impaired subjects in research than exist
for research subjects in general. In studies of persons with high-risk
disorders such as dementia, ongoing monitoring is necessary to determine if and when decisional incapacity develops.
Studies including decisionally incapacitated subjects with dementia should be done only to answer important questions that cannot be
adequately answered in persons who have intact capacity. If the study
presents more than minimal risk, then the appropriate reviewing
agency must determine that this risk is justified in relationship to the
knowledge to be gained. Close scrutiny of these questions is necessary
in patients with decisional incapacity because proxy consent is less desirable then individual consent. Therefore, added expectations
should be placed on IRBs52 to determine that any research project
with the decisionally impaired is necessary and that studies with
higher than minimal risk require that proxies have direct knowledge
of the person's prior values. These higher standards protect subjects
at risk but allow research to go on.
The degree of capacity necessary to participate in research can
vary with the degree of risk of the study. Research which carries more
than minimal risk can be carried out in persons with dementia who
have intact decisional capacityjust as they are in other individuals with
intact capacity. Subjects who have consented to participate and then
developed incapacity should be allowed to continue in the study as
long as they "assent" and their proxy agrees that the person would
want to have continued. However, it is too restrictive and unrealistic
to require that a decisionally impaired person have expressed wishes
specifically related to research because this would eliminate many individuals who would have participated. While there is no "right" to
participate in research, it seems wrong to establish a blanket prescription against the participation of individuals who have not expressed a
desire to participate in research while capacitated. However, individuals who no longer have' intact decisional capacity should be included
52. IRBs are institutional review boards charged with the responsibility of monitoring
research for the purpose of protecting research subjects.
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in studies with more than minimal risk only if the individuals will receive potential therapeutic benefit, have chosen a proxy prior to incapacity, or have indicated by written document that they would have
wanted to participate in such a study.
The. proposed durable power of attorney for research is an attractive solution. It has the benefits of determining that an expressed
prior wish to participate existed and of allowing the persons to choose
an individual who would make decisions for them. However, it is unlikely to be widely utilized and is, therefore, too restrictive to be the
only means for research participation by the decisionally impaired.
Christine Cassell argues that paternalism is appropriate in some
circumstances and that the social value of research should be considered in supporting the research enterprise."3 She concludes that "ethical caution" is necessity but that "flexibility and caution must go hand
in hand." 4 The challenge facing the researcher, proxy, ethicist, and
legislator is providing appropriate solutions without undue
restrictions.

53. See Christine Cassel, Research on Senile Dementia of the Alzheimer's Type: Ethical Issues
Involving Informed Consent, in Alzheimer's Dementia: Dilemmas in Clinical Research 99,
103-07 (V.L. Melnick & N. Dubler eds., 1985).
54. Id. at 107-08.

